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The spatial spillover effect of fiscal decentralization on local public provision: Mathematical application and empirical estimation

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WOS被引频次:5
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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Que, Wei;Zhang, Yabin*;Liu, Shaobo
通讯作者:
Zhang, Yabin
作者机构:
[Que, Wei; Zhang, Yabin] Hunan Univ, Dept Econ & Trade, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China.
[Liu, Shaobo] Cent S Univ, Sch Art & Architecture, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Zhang, Yabin] Hunan Univ, Dept Econ & Trade, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
Fiscal decentralization;Mathematical application;Spillover effect;Local public provision;Spatial analysis
期刊:
Applied Mathematics and Computation
ISSN:
0096-3003
年:
2018
卷:
331
页码:
416-429
文献类别:
WOS:Article;EI:Journal article (JA)
所属学科:
ESI学科类别:数学;WOS学科类别:Mathematics, Applied
入藏号:
WOS:000430396400034;EI:20181304963207
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
建筑与艺术学院
摘要:
This paper examines the spillover effect of fiscal decentralization on the provision of local public goods. The paper's objectives are as follows. First, we seek to discuss whether fiscal decentralization can affect &ldquo;Promotion Tournament Game&rdquo;among local governments through spillover effect of local public goods supply. Second, we also examine the intrinsic mechanism of such decentralized spillover effect. Finally, we analyze, if the spillover effect is possible, how much influence of fiscal decentralization on local public provision from both expenditure and revenue perspectives. Our analysis is based on a user fee model. The panel data from 31 Chinese provinces for the period of 1994&ndash;2013 are estimated using the spatial econometric method. The results show that revenue decentralization is negatively related to the local public provision, which is consistent with the &ldquo;Leviathan hypothesis&rdquo;. However, expenditure decentralization leads to an increase in the local public provision, which statistically proves the fierce competition in &ldquo;Promotion Tournament Game&rdquo;among Chinese governments.<br/> &copy;2018 Elsevier Inc.
参考文献:
Adam A, 2014, ECON GOV, V15, P17, DOI 10.1007/s10101-013-0131-4
Andersson L, 2004, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V11, P243, DOI 10.1023/B:ITAX.0000021970.40929.9a
ANDREONI J, 1988, J PUBLIC ECON, V37, P291, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90043-6
Baskaran T, 2010, PUBLIC CHOICE, V145, P351, DOI 10.1007/s11127.009.9570.4
BRITO DL, 1980, AM ECON REV, V70, P691

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